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Early in the year, Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Tanya Plibersek mounted a persuasive defence of reason
over emotion in a speech pleading for clemency for two Australians, Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran,
condemned to death in Indonesia. Referring to her own response when her brother was murdered in Port
Moresby, and reflecting her feeling that no punishment for his killers could have been extreme enough, she
called for universal and consistent rules to be applied, so that ‘we don’t make decisions about punishment on
the basis of how we feel’ (Ireland & Bourke 2015). This was an important intervention in a debate in which
more focus was given to the particularity of the case rather than to universal principles. Considerable public
emotion was aroused by representations of the worthy and redeemed character of the two accused. Yet, a
universal position opposing the death penalty would include all prisoners—including those who showed no
remorse, painted no pictures or refused any opportunities for atonement. Taking the feeling out of political
decision-making is sometimes a laudable aim but, it would seem, politically impossible in others. The fact that
Plibersek’s defence of reason was conducted in a wavering voice replete with emotion stands as a case in
point.
The complex entanglement between reason and emotion is evident in all political debate. In public discourse
the idea that politics is concerned only with the reasoned exchange of dispassionate arguments is maintained
by marginalising less rational human feelings and in viewing passions as politically dangerous. Over the last
decade, social and cultural theory has challenged the liberal notion that emotions have no place in the public
sphere. Putting emotion and affect at the centre of research and analysis, this focus on the emotions in the
social sciences and humanities has been called the ‘affective turn’. While this ‘turn’ encompasses a range of
methodologies and disciplines, it is founded on the premise that the social and political cannot be understood
without taking into account the embodied and less conscious aspects of human feeling. All  three books
under review situate themselves—or are situated by others—as working within this turn toward affectivity. In
Paul Hoggett and Simon Thompson’s collection, Politics and the Emotions: The Affective Turn in Contemporary
Political Studies, the subtitle signals the editors’ intention to apply the categories of emotion and affect to
different political situations, as do the essays in Nicolas Demertzis’ Emotions in Politics: The Affect Dimension in
Political Tension; a series of case studies on the role of complex feelings in different contemporary political
crises. Martha Nussbaum’s Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice is more difficult to categorise and sits
uncomfortably  within  these  contemporary  theoretical  developments.  Each  text  turns  attention  to  both
emotions and affects, with the conceptual distinction between the two revolving around consciousness and
discourse. Emotion is generally considered to refer to more conscious feelings that are anchored in language
and meaning (Hoggett & Thompson, 2012, pp. 2–3) and affects, pre-conscious sensations, often outside
discourse and located in the body’s capacity to be affected and to transmit sensations like anxiety or rage
through groups.
In their introduction to Politics and the Emotions, Hoggett and Thompson refer back to the Greeks and to
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Machiavelli to highlight how recent the separation of reason and the emotions is in political studies. In their
view, the human subject has been under-socialised by this emphasis on reason and an analysis of affect and
emotion will lead to insights into ‘the structure and the texture of society at its various levels, from the family
group,  through  to  organisations  and  beyond  to  the  wider  social  movements  in  civil  society’  (p.  3).
Contributors to the volume adopt a critical stance toward the idea of political subjects as rational actors.
Some contributions also reflect on and also criticise this rekindled interest  in the significance of human
feeling, the best of them documenting some of the political implications of this direction of theory. The book
covers a wide terrain and the overarching focus on affect sometimes makes for quite loose ties between
different essays. In an attempt to delimit this broad field, the editors provide a complicated and perhaps
unnecessary taxonomy of different emotions and how they can be defined. This typology of political feelings
is  ambitious  and  overly  schematic,  reminiscent  of  psychology  textbooks  of  the  1980s.  Emotions  are
organised into categories which include ‘positive moral emotions’, ‘negative feelings of repulsion’ and feelings
associated with loss, hurt and flight (pp. 7–12). The typology represents Hoggett and Thompson’s preference
for literature from the social sciences rather than contemporary cultural theory. This at times gives a rather
commonsensical quality to their categories. Notably, literary influences are scant and it is surprising to find
that they do not include the path-breaking work of Brian Massumi in their analysis. Massumi is known for his
radical rethinking of affect. His monograph, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (2002) attempts
to develop a new cultural and theoretical vocabulary specific to affect (p. 27). Affect is considered to be a
form of intensity and sensation that is always in movement and resistant to either meaning or critique (p. 28).
Accordingly,  affect  displaces  cognition  as  central  to  the  human subject.  Massumi’s  work  has  become a
touchstone for the affective turn and exerts a significant influence on this new multi-disciplinary field (Gregg
& Seigworth, 2010, p. 5). Unlike Massumi, Hoggett and Thompson appear more interested in the positive,
transformative nature of emotions, (not necessarily positive emotions themselves) than in affect as either an
intensity or as ‘a central mechanism of social reproduction’ (Hemmings 2005, p. 551).
Politics and the Emotions successfully questions the axiom that reasoned argument leads to good policymaking.
Essays range from discussions about deliberative democracy, challenging a model of deliberation as neutral
and  dispassionate,  to  the  role  of  feeling  in  conflict  and  post-conflict  societies,  including  a  powerful
‘emotional history of the civil war in Sierra Leone’ by Steven Kaindaneh and Andrew Rigby (pp. 161–166).
This  essay  and  its  focus  on  the  consolidation  of  particular  collective  emotions,  and  indeed  the  book’s
attention  to  activist  mobilisation  and  protest  taps  into  a  rich  vein  of  scholarship  over  the  last  decade
concerning the role of emotions in social movement activity. James Jasper provides an instructive overview
of  this  work  that  attempts  to  understand  affective  loyalties  in  movement  mobilisation,  the  emotions
associated with political  agency  and the affective  conditions  that  sustain  group cohesion in  the face  of
personal danger (Jasper 2011). Aspects of movements that were previously considered epiphenomenal or
unimportant are now given due explanatory power in this literature and this widens our comprehension of
activism and the ties that can underpin social movement participation.
Deborah Gould’s essay in the Hoggett and Thompson collection offers a model analysis of the potential of
this theoretical framework. She outlines her research on the direct action AIDS movement in America, ACT
UP (AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power) and a history of what she calls its ‘affective landscape’ (p. 96). From
the sense of empowerment and optimism that activists experienced in 1987 and 1988, Gould documents the
accumulating deaths of the early 1990s and the relentless suffering and grief, pessimism and depletion of
AIDS activists as they ferried friends to doctor’s appointments and hospices, changed incontinence pads,
cleaned bedsores and ‘went to memorial service after memorial service’ (p. 98). While not as large as the
epidemic in Africa, Gould’s essay reminds us of the devastating scale of the AIDS epidemic in America, and
her analysis also creates an emotional, visceral response in the reader. Her account draws some quite original
conclusions about the role of despair as a mobilising force, with examples of how ACT UP turned grief into
anger. Her insight into the way collective feelings are always contingent, and that despair does not necessarily
deactivate  its  subjects,  demonstrates  some of  the best  possibilities  that  an affective  theoretical  turn can
provide.
In Emotions in Politics: The Affect Dimension in Political Tension Nicolas Demertzis has collected essays within a
similar  theoretical  framework  to  that  Hoggett  and  Thompson  work  within,  which  Demertzis  calls  the
‘emotionology’ of our times (p. 4). His book is distinguished by its specific case study approach and its focus
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on historical and contemporary moments of political tension. Such moments include the Greek financial
crisis,  the Arab Spring, the rise of British ethno-nationalist movements and contemporary Islamophobia.
Without this concern with political ruptures, it would be difficult to make a clear distinction between the
essays  in  these  two collections.  In  some ways,  Demertzis’  book is  less  psychological  than Hoggett  and
Thompson’s, even though it is published in the Palgrave Studies of Political Psychology series. It attempts to
retrieve the role of affect in analyses of civic action and the organisation of political power (p. 1). Avoiding a
decisive definition of the emotions, or the difference between emotion and affect, Demertzis acknowledges
that much can be ‘lost in translation’ when emotions are rigidly fixed and classified (p. 4). He prefers, instead,
to emphasise the plasticity of emotions and how subject they are to historical variability. Importantly, the
essays included in Emotions in Politics, conceive of emotions as culturally, socially and psychologically mediated
yet  not  entirely  reducible  to  a  social  construction.  This  recognition that  there  is  a  bodily  dimension to
emotions at a neurobiological level is different from the school of thought represented by Massumi (2002),
which concerns itself with affect as an ‘other than conscious knowing’ at the level of bodily sensations, a
visceral state that has only an oblique association to social and political relations.
In keeping with Demertzis’  aim to ‘combine theory-building with empirical,  lived examples’  (p.  10),  his
analysis (with Bettina Davou) of the Greek financial crisis highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of a
politically informed sociological approach to the role of emotions in politics. The essay ‘Feeling the Greek
Financial Crisis’,  attempts to unravel the various feelings expressed in media reports of the crisis and to
determine the relationship between the emotional response of Greek citizens and their political attitudes,
voting behaviors or activism. The authors map the affective contours of the crisis in terms of reported social
displacement,  mistrust  of  institutions,  personal  loss,  alienation,  the  pauperisation  of  pensioners  and  the
occurrence of attempted suicides (p. 94). They acknowledge that affective responses to the Greek financial
crisis are multi-faceted and that these media representations, may not necessarily reflect what people actually
feel (p. 93). Nonetheless, the essay provides significant insight into a less visible side of the financial crisis and
how people’s internal worlds are shattered by the external disruptions. The authors remind us that for Greece
there is a ‘vivid collective memory’ of the famine of 1940–41 occasioned by the Axis occupation during
World War Two, and that this fearful memory is mobilised by many Greek commentators who describe the
current crisis as a ‘new occupation’ (p. 97).
Less persuasive is the claim that the emotional response to the financial crisis has not led to a ‘systematic and
massive action’ but instead to several  ‘low-risk’,  ‘low effort actions’ (p. 97).  This is easy to criticise with
hindsight as the essay concentrates on the years 2010–11 and so pre-dates the explosion of collective action
around the ‘bailout referendum’ of 2015. Demertzis and Davou seemed to forget that emotional responses
are poor predictors of cultural and political developments. In 2013 they wrote:
Greek society appears so emotionally weakened that possibilities for reversing the emotional
climate are scarce. In the absence of a robust civil society, and the presence of fear, hopelessness
and political inefficacy, social solidarity is hardly expected to flourish (p. 114).
There were many remarkable features of the July 2015 referendum on whether Greece should accept the
austerity measures and bailout conditions imposed by the European Commission, the International Monetary
Fund and the banks. The expression of social solidarity around the overwhelming ‘Oxi’  (No) vote in all
regions of Greece was overwhelming. It was neither low-risk nor ‘low-effort’ as the authors had predicted.
The notoriously unstable and often transitory nature of affects, what Demertzis himself calls their ‘plasticity’
(p. 4), is precisely one of the limitations of affect theory if applied instrumentally to collectivities, as though
emotions are simply a resource to be mobilised by certain rational interests, rather than infused with symbolic
identifications, cultural meanings, conflicts and displacements at the level of the individual person.
The quintessentially political emotion, according to Thomas Hobbes is fear because only fear is capable of
forcing us into political association with one another (Hoggett & Thompson 2012, p. 130). This view is
subjected to a most rigorous epistemological and ethical challenge in Martha Nussbaum’s Political Emotions:
Why Love Matters for Justice (2013). Love replaces fear in her hierarchy of which emotions are most important
for democracy. The sheer ambition of this book and its philosophical, literary, cultural and scholarly breadth
makes any review by definition highly selective. Nussbaum does not set out to tackle a familiar social issue
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and ‘just add emotions and stir’, the impression sometimes created by the sheer number of symposiums,
special issues of journals, conferences and textbooks with ‘affect’ in the title. In fact, as I have suggested
above,  it  is  difficult  to  situate  Nussbaum’s  work  within  a  single  theoretical  category,  so  broad  and
all-encompassing is her analysis. Her book builds on her previous scholarship on the cognitive and moral
dimensions of emotions as thoughts, evaluative judgments and beliefs (Nussbaum 2001). In Political Emotions
her focus is on liberal political principles and the proposition that love is an absolute necessity for liberal
democracy to flourish. Emotions, in her view, have a moral value and can be cultivated by music, poetry,
sculpture, civic festivals and nations themselves. This ‘political cultivation of emotion’ requires engendering
‘strong commitment to worthy projects that require effort and sacrifice’ and to keep the forces of disgust,
envy and ‘the desire to inflict shame on others’ at bay (p. 3). Unlike perspectives that see reason and emotion
in opposition, Nussbaum rejects a characterisation of emotions as ‘just impulses’ and conceives of emotions
as evaluative, as containing appraisals within them (p. 6). At the risk of trivialising what by any counts is a
monumental and important study, it is as though all the good emotions have a little bit of reason embedded
in them, emotions-lite perhaps.
Throughout  Political  Emotions,  Naussbaum imagines  an  unrealised  but  aspirational  ideal  of  a  democratic
society where the finer emotions are cultivated by and serve the liberal state for the common good, without
sacrificing a space for individual liberties, critical inquiry, pluralism or dissent. It is difficult to reconcile the
nobility of the principles she so poetically espouses and the actual social conditions in neo-liberal societies,
particularly those suffering from austerity policies and ideologies today. Neo-liberalism is not a term that
appears at all in Naussbaum’s book. While she promotes the importance of a ‘vigilant critical culture’ as the
‘key to the stability of liberal values’, (p. 124) her ideal society is one of consensus rather than conflict. She
writes: ‘The consensus may not exist at present, but it ought to be a plausible possibility for the future, and
we should be able to envisage a plausible trajectory from where we currently are to such a consensus’ (p.
128).
Coming from a framework that views the social world as involving a struggle for and against domination and
an ongoing conflict between social and class adversaries to control community life, I find it difficult to see as
plausible Naussbaum’s longed for trajectory. The chasm between the ideal and the actual appears most stark
in the book’s fascination with and attachment to India. It is certainly enriching to read extracts from the
exquisite  poetry,  novels  and songs  of  Nobel  Prize  winning Bengali  literary  figure  Rabindranath  Tagore.
Naussbaum  is  also  keen  to  include  key  literary  and  philosophical  thinkers  from  India  in  the  usually
European-focused list of liberal thinkers. This has little to do with an attempt to decolonise a Western canon
than  her  staunch  belief  that  much can  be  learned  about  truth  and conceptions  of  justice  from Indian
intellectual  traditions  and  figures  like  Tagore,  Gandhi  or  Bankimchandra  Chatterjee.  Nevertheless,  in
following Tagore, and arguing that India’s present problems should be confronted in ‘a spirit of love’, is
Naussbaum taking refuge in romanticism? Her naïve directive appears completely irrelevant to the inequality
and violence of a globalised India today.
In Political Emotions Naussbaum gives serious weight to the role of art and music in a liberal just society. She
somewhat idealistically views art as having an inherently democratic spirit and writes that ‘poetry, music and
art are great uniters: they take people out of themselves and forge a shared community’ (p. 388). Slavoj
Žižek’s analysis of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is an antidote to this idealised view that a shared community
through music necessarily has anything to do with either love or justice. In the brilliant and unexpectedly
illuminating  British  documentary  The  Pervert’s  Guide  to  Ideology  (Feinnes  2012),  Žižek  discusses  the  way
Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ has come to represent an anthem that is ‘a kind of an ode to humanity as such, to
the brotherhood and freedom of all people’. He then traces the shadowy history of this towering piece of
music, showing images of various dictators and regimes listening to it, from the Nazis, for whom the ode was
a nationalist anthem, to its celebration as a communist song by Stalin in the Soviet Union, its use in the
Cultural Revolution in China (when almost all other Western music was banned) and its significance for the
extreme right when Zimbabwe was the apartheid state of Southern Rhodesia. He points out that now the
Ninth Symphony has become the unofficial anthem for the European Union. Žižek argues that this piece of
music  allows  us  to  imagine  ‘a  perverse  scene  of  universal  fraternity  in  which  the  world’s  dictators,
arch-terrorists, and war criminals all embrace each other’ (2012). Absurd though this image may be, it is a
vivid reminder that the emotions Naussbaum celebrates—love, compassion, national pride, or the value of
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fine music—can equally serve the opposite of a just society. Extremely authoritarian forms of group bonding
can be based on love as much as on hate.
The danger in the ‘affective turn’ is that affects can be viewed as abstract rather than placed in their social
and political context. At a time when populism is on the rise in Australia and internationally, and when fear is
employed widely as a mode of governance, it is important to keep the dark side of affectivity in mind. The
public  expression  of  emotions  is  always  mobilising—but  not  necessarily  in  a  positive  direction.  Tanya
Plibersek recognised this  risk in her plea for a  universal  principle  of  reason to be applied at  a  time of
heightened personal  and political  emotions around the execution of Chan and Sukumaran in Indonesia.
There is no formula for when emotions in the public sphere are enabling or tyrannical. If the affective turn is
to expand our understanding of contemporary politics, both affects and emotions need always to be situated
socially, ideologically and historically within relations of power.
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